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The principle of subsidiarity in the European Union confines the policy-making and law-making 
competences of Union authorities to situations where the designated policy aims cannot be more 
effectively achieved at lower (i.e. national, regional or local) levels of governance. There are two 
institutionalised avenues envisaged to safeguard the EU institutions’ compliance with this principle. 
Besides the jurisdiction of the Court of Justice in ruling on all legal questions arising from the 
application and interpretation of the Treaties, another important instrument is entrusted to the 
Member States’ parliaments. This consists of the political scrutiny of the proposed EU laws with 
regard to compliance with subsidiarity. This paper intends to juxtapose these institutionalised 
avenues through an analysis of the principle of subsidiarity as it appears throughout the case law of 
the Court of Justice and within the subsidiarity monitoring procedure performed by the national 
parliaments. The aim is to assess the suitability of the judicial and parliamentary procedures for 
ensuring compliance with subsidiarity, and whether the principle, owing to its dual nature, i.e. both 
legal and political, can be efficiently complied with at all in the course of EU regulatory practice, 
either as being judicially enforced or politically safeguarded. After identifying the key shortcomings 
of both procedures, it will be shown that the present system is rather complex and ineffective. Such a 
system is unsatisfactory when compared with the constitutional importance of the principle of 
subsidiarity, and, furthermore, when the EU continues to expand its regulatory practices to sensitive 
socio-political spheres usually understood as national competences. Finally, novel institutional 
arrangements, addressing the main criticism and combining the features of both judicial and 
political systems in safeguarding the principle of subsidiarity, are proposed. 
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1. INTRODUCTION 
The general idea of subsidiarity is derived from the political concept of decentralisation. 
It mandates that community actions ought to be taken at the most immediate level of 
governance, for the sake of the efficiency and consistency of the action, higher 
accountability and transparency of the public authorities, and increased civic inclusion in 
decision-making. Subsidiarity is thus essential for the regulation of the division of 
competences between the central and state (regional or local) levels. Power-sharing and 
institutional balance in the federal systems predicate its application. Its rationale is to 
guarantee “a degree of independence to a lower authority in relation to the higher one, i.e. 
for a local government in relation to the central government”.1 As one of the general 
principles of European Union (hereinafter “the EU” or “the Union”) law, subsidiarity is a 
strongly politically driven concept. In a quasi-federal EU system, it enjoys the status of a 
fundamental constitutional principle of the European constitutional space. In practice, 
subsidiarity confines EU policy- and law-making competences to cases in which the 
designated policy aims cannot be more effectively achieved at lower (i.e. national, regional 
or local) levels of governance. Besides limiting EU decision-making powers, the principle 
of subsidiarity at the same time democratically legitimises the Union’s actions, when EU 
competence to act and the appropriateness and rationality of such action are established.2 
However, the EU principle of subsidiarity until today has remained a rather vague, 
ambiguous and fluid concept, which initially sparked numerous academic and political 
debates. It is perhaps surprising that, after extensive and fierce discussions during the 
1990s and early 2000s following its codification in EU primary law, subsidiarity 
somewhat managed to escape the attention and interest of both scholars and politicians. 
As presented in this paper, early general consensus on the weaknesses of subsidiarity as 
a legal and political principle has persisted. Despite the constitutional importance of the 
principle of subsidiarity, the numerous political crises faced by the Union during the last 
decade, and the expansion of EU regulation into sensitive socio-political spheres, political 
and scholarly elites have failed to explain satisfactorily and offer new solutions to the 
“subsidiarity conundrum”. Other important topics of EU constitutional law, such as 
general legal principles or the legitimacy of judicial decision-making, have similarly been 
absent from the discourse at the EU level for a significant period. Only recently has 
scholarly interest in these topics re-emerged. Therefore, this contribution highlights the 
need to re-introduce discussion on subsidiarity to contemporary EU legal and political 
thought. 
Almost thirty years after its first appearance, there is still no clear, detailed or widely 
accepted definition in the EU of  the legal substance of subsidiarity, or what the 
enforceability criteria are for assessing compliance with and potential violations of the 
                                                        
1 Raffaelli R., The Principle of Subsidiarity, European Parliament - Fact Sheets on the EU, 2016, available at: 
http://www.europarl.europa.eu/atyourservice/en/displayFtu.html?ftuId=FTU_1.2.2.html. 
2 Mataija, M., The Role of the National Parliaments, in: Reform of the European Union - The Lisbon Treaty, 
Rodin, S., Ćapeta, T. & Goldner Lang, I. (Eds.), Narodne novine, 2009, p. 153. 
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principle.3 What is more, some critics have even rejected the appropriateness of 
subsidiarity for steering the division of powers in the EU federal setting, where two (or 
more) levels of legitimate legislators operate, with overlapping competences and with 
each legislator’s “conflicting policies and interests”.4 Notwithstanding the lack of 
definition and its alleged normative inappropriateness, subsidiarity as a multifaceted 
principle relates to many other important legal and political issues and concepts. Their 
interplay is likewise worth exploring. Perhaps it stands most saliently within the debate 
on the “creeping competences” of the EU, i.e. the claim that Union regulation encroaches 
on national legal orders and covertly seizes ever more competences from domestic levels. 
This was the main driver for devising two institutionalised avenues in the EU for 
safeguarding the application of and compliance with the principle of subsidiarity. Besides 
the jurisdiction of the Court of Justice (hereinafter “CJEU” or “the Court”) to rule on all 
legal questions arising from the application and interpretation of the Treaties, another 
important procedure is performed by the Member States’ parliaments. This consists of 
political scrutiny of proposed EU laws relating to their compliance with subsidiarity. 
Through this “pre-legislative constitutional intervention device”,5 national parliaments, 
often described as the greatest losers in the Europeanisation process, appear essentially 
as the “watchdogs” of the principle of subsidiarity, and implicitly of their own 
competences. 
The present paper intends to juxtapose these two institutionalised avenues through an 
analysis of the principle of subsidiarity as it appears throughout the CJEU case law and 
within the subsidiarity monitoring procedure performed by the national parliaments. The 
aim is to assess whether either the judicial or the parliamentary procedure is better suited 
for ensuring compliance with subsidiarity, and whether the principle, owing to its dual 
nature, i.e. both legal and political,6 can at all be efficiently respected in the course of EU 
                                                        
3 Ex-president of the European Commission Jacques Delors thus once famously and in jest offered a “prize 
of 200 000 pound for a clear definition of subsidiarity”, and argued firmly that “it only makes sense in a 
clear federal approach”, in sharp contrast to the EU’s dynamic sui generis nature. See Jensen, M. D. & 
Martinsen, D. S., Out of Time? National Parliaments and Early Decision Making in the European Union,  OPAL 
Online Paper Series, Vol. 8, 2012, p. 7., available at: http://www.opal-europe.org/index.php? 
option=com_content&view=article&id=76&Itemid=108. 
4 Davies, G., Subsidiarity: The Wrong Idea, in the Wrong Place at the Wrong Time, Common Market Law 
Review, Vol. 43, No. 1, 2006, p. 78-80. The historical origins of the notion of subsidiarity are traced back to 
the Roman Catholic doctrine and German legal thinking. The main claim is that the function of subsidiarity 
is only fulfilled in the spheres of homogenous nation-states or non-governmental entities such as religious 
organisations. In this context, subsidiarity regulates the appropriate level of action while assuming that “all 
levels [of governance] are united in wishing to achieve certain goals and that none has any other interests 
or objectives which conflict with [the former]”. Therefore, according to these views in a federal setting (or 
functional, quasi-federal entities such as the EU), where the central level legislates on the “most sensitive 
and traditional national competences (criminal law, welfare state, taxation and economic policy) that 
encompass almost all aspects of socio-economic activity”, and in which strong tension between the Member 
States and the EU authority exists, the application of subsidiarity seems to be untenable. 
5 Cygan, A., The Parliamentarisation of EU Decision-making? The Impact of the Treaty of Lisbon on National 
Parliaments, European Law Review, Vol. 36, No. 4, 2011, p. 484. 
6 The other dimensions of subsidiarity, e.g. economic ones, which are reflected in the comparative weighing 
of cost-effectiveness, are largely left out of the discussion in this paper. For more insights on the notion of 
subsidiarity as an economic principle, see Meuwese, A. C. M., Impact Assessment in EU Lawmaking, Kluwer 
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regulatory practice, either as being judicially enforced or politically safeguarded. The 
main finding is that both procedures are plagued with shortcomings that render the entire 
system of safeguarding subsidiarity as rather complex and ineffective, thus downplaying 
the practical importance and status of the principle itself. The theoretical framework for 
the critical assessment of the two institutionalised avenues for safeguarding subsidiarity 
is found in the seminal academic contributions discussing the legal7 and political8 
essentials of the subsidiarity principle. A group of authors wrote critically on the CJEU’s 
role in the legal exercise of subsidiarity monitoring, and in general questioned the 
justiciability of the principle, from the time when the Maastricht Treaty first explicitly 
introduced the principle and when the topic was strongly debated by academics and 
politicians alike. Similarly, other authors observed the role of national parliaments in the 
political exercise of subsidiarity monitoring after the Lisbon Treaty had introduced this 
mechanism, and immediately identified the main shortcomings of the procedure that still 
exist today. In the present paper, all these arguments are systematised, compared and re-
assessed in the new context of the Union, with all the novel challenges it is facing, and with 
old unanswered questions, such as subsidiarity, slowly re-emerging. 
The paper’s structure is as follows. In Part 1, the origins, historical development, rationale 
and nature of the principle of subsidiarity are addressed in brief, providing a background 
for further discussion. After reflecting on the limited and vague legal phrasing of 
subsidiarity, additional far-reaching issues and debates connected with the principle of 
subsidiarity are introduced. These issues are of significant political and legal importance 
in the contemporary academic and political discourse in the EU. After setting the stage in 
this opening part, Part 2 proceeds by defining the concepts of subsidiarity as presently 
stated in the EU Treaties, justiciability as defined in the legal theory, and parliamentary 
scrutiny as a political mechanism for controlling decision-making. Hence, we first turn to 
the practice of the Court of Justice and in selected instances observe its assessment of the 
principle of subsidiarity. The present discussion is also extended to the more general issue 
of the justiciability of the principle. The following section opens with a description of the 
mechanisms devised by the Lisbon Treaty, which ensure the participation of the Member 
States’ parliaments in the decision-making processes at the EU level, and their role in 
ensuring the compliance of all legislative acts with the principle of subsidiarity. Similarly 
to the previous section, the suitability of the political monitoring of the principle by the 
national legislators is observed in general terms. In conclusion, Part 3 highlights the 
present state of affairs regarding the status of the principle of subsidiarity in the EU and 
offers new institutional solutions. 
                                                        
Law International, 2008. For an account of the private dimension of the subsidiarity debate which is also 
important in economic terms, see Craig, P., Subsidiarity: A Political and Legal Analysis, Journal of Common 
Market Studies, Vol. 50, No 1, 2012, pp. 72-87. 
7 For instance, Toth, A. G., Is Subsidiarity Justiciable? European Law Review, Vol. 19, No. 3, 1994. 
8 For instance, Kiiver, P., The Early-warning System for the Principle of Subsidiarity: the National 
Parliaments as a Conseil d’Etat for Europe, European Law Review, Vol. 36, No. 1, 2011. 
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After providing an overview and critique of the substantive, procedural and institutional 
elements of subsidiarity, the main argument will be that the present EU legal framework 
for safeguarding subsidiarity is highly complex and ineffective. The previous literature on 
the topic was similarly critical and uncertain about the prospects of having a fully 
functioning legal and political system of subsidiarity monitoring. However, the vast 
majority of that scholarship was exhausted by merely describing the system as inefficient, 
accepting the Court’s reluctance to engage in subsidiarity as a legal principle, and the 
national parliaments’ inability to engage properly with subsidiarity as a political principle. 
In addition, subsidiarity debates declined in number and vigour following the emergence 
of the subsequent financial, humanitarian and political crises plaguing the EU. The 
diminished discursive and practical importance of the subsidiarity principle as we 
witness it today is diametrically opposed to its constitutional rank. Such an absence of 
subsidiarity-related arguments from political and academic focus is unsatisfactory, 
especially given the increasing contemporary discussions on the future “variable 
geometry” or “multiple speed” of EU integration. 
For all these reasons, novel institutional arrangements that would combine the features 
of both the judicial and political system in observing the principle of subsidiarity are 
proposed. This suggestion of a new arrangement for ensuring the effective application of 
subsidiarity, together with an assessment of the principle in the contemporary context, is 
the main contribution of the present paper. By offering unique lex ferenda solutions, the 
paper departs from the previous literature that mostly remains satisfied with unravelling 
lex lata. The relevance of this proposal is also found in the recently renewed legal and 
political interest in subsidiarity in the EU. The EU institutions have already put forward 
ideas on possible institutional reforms.9 During a recent EU summit, the Benelux countries 
made an official statement calling for the strengthening of the subsidiarity principle, 
which would endorse EU action only “in areas of clear European added value and when 
Member States themselves are not able to deliver for their citizens”.10 Finally, the “Rome 
Declaration on the Future of the EU”, which marked the anniversary of the adoption of the 
founding Treaty of Rome, indirectly refers to the importance of the principle of 
subsidiarity, in the part where it declares the intention to have the EU “big on big issues 
and small on small ones” and to “enhance cooperation with national parliaments”.11 This 
slowly but steadily emerging awareness of the importance of subsidiarity proposes a 
novel institutional arrangement, reconceptualising the legal and political procedures for 
safeguarding the principle of subsidiarity, both in a timely and warranted manner. 
Moreover, the timing for the re-analysis of subsidiarity is apt, given the unprecedented 
                                                        
9 See, for example, European Parliament resolution of 16 February 2017 on possible evolutions of and 
adjustments to the current institutional set-up of the European Union (2014/2248(INI)), available at 
http://www.europarl.europa.eu/sides/getDoc.do?type=TA&reference=P8-TA-2017 
0048&language=EN&ring=A8-2016-0390. 
10 FPS Chancellery of the Prime Minister of Belgium, Benelux vision on the future of Europe, Press Release, 
2017, available at http://premier.fgov.be/en/benelux-vision-future-europe. 
11 European Council, Declaration of the leaders of 27 member states and of the European Council, the European 
Parliament and the European Commission, 2017, available at: http://www.consilium.europa.eu/en/pr 
ess/press-releases/2017/03/25-rome-declaration/. 
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challenges the EU is nowadays facing, the uncertainties about the proper course and level 
of action to address them, and the different political climate and legal state of affairs in 
the Union when compared with the period between the Maastricht and Lisbon Treaties 
when the leading explanations of subsidiarity-related issues first appeared. 
2. SUBSIDIARITY BEFORE THE EU COURTS AND THE MEMBER STATES’ 
PARLIAMENTS: SUBSTANTIVE AND PROCEDURAL ESSENTIALS OF THE 
PRINCIPLE  
2.1. Origins, historical development, rationale and nature of the principle of 
subsidiarity 
With no mention of the principle in the original founding Treaties,12 the official genesis of 
subsidiarity in the EU began with the adoption of the Single European Act, albeit only with 
a reference to a particular policy area – environmental protection – and without being 
named as such.13 The constitutionalisation of the principle of subsidiarity then further 
proceeded in parallel with the expanding scope of EU policy competences and the 
increasing exercise of powers by the Union authorities.14 Since the EU law-making powers 
grew through successive Treaty amendments, and were exercised by “qualified majority 
voting in the Council, combined with an increased co-legislative role for the European 
Parliament”,15 Member States tried to compensate for the loss of the right to veto EU 
action by instituting protective political safeguard clauses. The original unclear division 
of competences between the EU and Member States called for a more precise “assignment 
of subject matter areas to respective spheres of government”,16 which was to be 
complemented by subsidiarity. When the political consensus for achieving this was finally 
reached, subsidiarity was explicitly enlisted as a general principle of EU law in the Treaty 
of Maastricht.17 The legal framework of subsidiarity was thus gradually constructed and 
developed in-depth proportionally to this increase of the competences transferred to the 
                                                        
12 However, the 1957 Treaty of Rome did incorporate fragments of the idea of subsidiarity, albeit in terms 
and forms different from those that we know today. For the development of the idea of subsidiarity in the 
EU preceding the 1992 Treaty of Maastricht, see Lenaerts, K., The Principle of Subsidiarity and the 
Environment in the European Union: Keeping the Balance of Federalism, Fordham Journal of International 
Law, Vol. 17, No. 4, 1993. 
13 Constantin, S., Rethinking Subsidiarity and the Balance of Powers in the EU in Light of the Lisbon Treaty and 
Beyond, Croatian Yearbook of European Law and Policy, Vol. 4, 2008, p. 154. 
14 de Burca, G., Reappraising Subsidiarity’s Significance after Amsterdam, Harvard Jean Monnet Working 
Paper, No. 7/99, 2000, p. 20, available at: http://www.jeanmonnetprogram.org/papers/99/990701.html. 
15 Lenaerts, op. cit. (n. 12), p. 851. 
16 Craig, op. cit. (n. 6), p. 73. 
17 Wyatt, D., Could a “Yellow Card” for National Parliaments Strengthen Judicial as well as Political Policing of 
Subsidiarity? Croatian Yearbook of European Law and Policy, Vol. 2, 2006, p. 2. Interestingly, the then-Court 
of First Instance of the European Communities in Case T-29/92 Vereniging van Samenwerkende v. the 
Commission ECLI:EU:T:1995:34 (paras. 330-331) ruled that the “principle of subsidiarity did not, before the 
entry into force of the Treaty on European Union, constitute a general principle of law by reference to which 
the legality of Community acts should be reviewed”. 
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EU level: more competences for the EU meant greater prominence for subsidiarity.18 
Therefore, subsidiarity was envisaged to operate as a “mediating concept” that aims to 
“arbitrate the tension between [the dynamics of political] integration and [decision-
making] proximity”.19   
Subsidiarity was originally viewed as a “dynamic concept”, dependent on the ever-
changing and adapting relationship between the Union and Member States. It was 
envisaged as flexible enough to be “expanded if the circumstances require so”, as well as 
“restricted or discontinued when it is no longer justified”.20 Put differently, subsidiarity 
was meant to allow the Member States to “create more Europe in some areas and less 
Europe in others”,21 depending on their immediate interests and practical realities. 
However, one element remained at the core of the “normative mismatch” surrounding 
subsidiarity, which will be addressed in more detail under the next two subheadings. It 
was the “fact that the [Union’s] competences tend to be defined in terms of objectives to 
be achieved”, reflecting the functional nature of the EU as an international organisation, 
“rather than in areas of activity to be regulated”, which would be the case in a classic 
federal setting.22 Such a goal-oriented definition of EU competences made it more difficult 
to put the principle of subsidiarity into operation. 
At present, every analysis of subsidiarity inevitably departs from the current definition of 
the principle as contained in Article 5 of the Treaty on the European Union (TEU).23 By 
default, this definition spells out a presumption against EU action in favour of 
decentralisation,24 similarly to what the previous versions of the same definition asserted. 
It may thus be considered as counterintuitive that ever since subsidiarity has been 
codified in EU law, the “excessive and increased centralization in various policy areas at 
the EU level” has kept occurring, which could not be “justified or politically legitimized by 
the characteristics or goals of the respective policy areas” but rather with the need to 
respond ad hoc to particular crises.25 Therefore, despite the strict language of the Treaty-
based definition (“the EU shall…”), the application of subsidiarity to the delineation of 
competences between the EU and its Member States is still rather problematic. It is 
likewise contested whether compliance with the principle indeed only affects the 
allocation of the exercise of the already established EU competences,26 and does not 
                                                        
18 Constantin, op. cit. (n. 13), p. 155. 
19 Lenaerts, op. cit. (n. 12), p. 856. 
20 Toth, op. cit. (n. 7), p. 281. 
21 Constantin, op. cit. (n. 13), p. 159. 
22 Davies, op. cit. (n. 4), p. 72. 
23 Article 5(3) TEU, 2012, OJ C 326, provides that “in areas which do not fall within its exclusive competence, 
the Union shall act only if and insofar as the objectives of the proposed action cannot be sufficiently achieved 
by the Member States, either at central level or at regional and local level,  but  can  rather,  by  reason  of  
the  scale  or  effects  of  the proposed action, be better achieved at Union level”. 
24 Cygan, op. cit. (n. 5), p. 483. 
25 van Zeben, J., Research Agenda For a Polycentric European Union, The Vincent and Elinor Ostrom 
Workshop in Political Theory and Policy Analysis Working Paper Series No. W13-13, 2013, p. 7. 
26 Toth, op. cit. (n. 7), p. 272. It is also important to highlight in this context that in theory the principle of 
subsidiarity can be breached not only when the EU acts ultra vires, but also if the Member States exceed 
their competences in regulating the area within shared competences. 
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expand EU competences at the expense of exclusive national competences, as the EU 
increasingly encroaches on more regulatory sovereignty of the national legislators. 
In the new version of the definition of subsidiarity, for the first time an explicit reference 
is made to the regions and local communities in the context of the application of the 
principle. This is especially relevant for the newly emerged policy areas such as energy, 
environmental protection and climate change.27 It is also important in the sense of 
acknowledging that the vertical allocation of competences does not involve only EU and 
Member States’ central governments, but also a variety of regional and sub-regional levels 
of governance. In addition, the application of the principle of subsidiarity concerns only 
areas falling outside exclusive EU competences, i.e. shared or concurrent competences.28 
If this is established, the following check is at which level of governance the Union or 
national objectives are better achieved in accordance with the principle of effectiveness.29 
Three general criteria for assessing the suitability of the proposed EU action in the light 
of subsidiarity are thus recognised: (i) the transnational element and the Treaty basis; (ii) 
necessity; and (iii) scale or effectiveness (i.e. the “added value”).30 In EU political 
discourse, subsidiarity is most often associated with delivering policy and making 
decisions “as closely as possible to the citizens”,31 a reference contained in the Treaties 
and explicitly highlighted in the so-called “proximity principle”.32 However, besides 
“democratic subsidiarity”, the theory also distinguishes what may be referred to as 
“executive subsidiarity” and “utilitarian subsidiarity”, with each conception reflecting a 
different view about the aims and purposes of the principle.33 The democratic argument 
for appropriate distribution of powers between levels of government in the EU 
emphasises protection of citizens’ rights and the closeness of the decision-making to the 
citizens. An executive version of the argument stresses the importance of the protection 
of Member States’ executive prerogatives against encroachment by the EU regulator. The 
                                                        
27 Arribas, G. V. & Bourdin, D., What Does the Lisbon Treaty Change Regarding Subsidiarity within the EU 
Institutional Framework?, European Institute of Public Administration Bulletin, Vol. 2, 2012, p. 13, available 
at: http://publications.eipa.eu/en/eipascope/search/&tid=1720. 
28 The Lisbon Treaty also for the first time introduced a clear demarcation between the EU and Member 
States’ competences, dividing them into three categories: exclusive EU competences, competences shared 
between the EU and Member States, and EU supporting competences. See Articles 3 to 6 of the TFEU. 
29 Lenaerts, op. cit. (n 12), p. 875-876. Lenaerts argues that this essentially indicates, as the crucial criterion 
for ascertaining effectiveness, assessment of the “means at the disposal of the Member States”. This can 
result in two scenarios: (i) if the “means at the disposal of at least one Member State prove to be ineffective 
to sufficiently achieve the objectives of the proposed action, the need for some [EU] action will be 
established, as these objectives will then indeed be ‘better achieved’ by the [Union]”; or (ii) if the “means 
available to all Member States are perfectly effective in order to sufficiently achieve the objectives of the 
proposed action, but the [EU] is more efficient in achieving these objectives”, the Union action in those cases 
should still not be disregarded from the outset, if the action in question can “benefit from economies of scale 
when undertaken at the EU level”. On the contrary, Wyatt proposes that assessing the compliance with 
subsidiarity should be in fact a single-step test: determining whether the “objectives of the proposed action 
can only be achieved by the EU-wide action” (emphasis added). See Wyatt, op. cit. (n. 17), p. 5. 
30 Toth, op. cit. (n. 7), pp. 270-271 
31 Arribas & Bourdin, op. cit. (n. 27), p. 15. 
32 Article 10(3) TEU: “Decisions shall be taken as openly and as closely as possible to the citizen.” 
33 de Burca, op. cit. (n. 14), pp. 14-15. 
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utilitarian argument favours the interests of the policy-making per se, i.e. efficiency, 
consistency, and comprehensiveness of actions and outcomes.34 
Horizontally, the principle of subsidiarity extends in its significance to many other 
concepts and issues of essential importance for the governance and institutional 
framework of the EU. First, as indicated above, it stems from a wider background of 
democratic theory, which demands greater inclusion of the political demos in decision-
making affairs. Arguably, it is most efficiently achieved at the lowest levels of governance 
where feasible. This also addresses concerns of the Union’s democratic deficit that has 
shadowed the EU integration project from the very beginnings. However, for some 
commentators the intention to bring citizens closer to the Union stands distinct from the 
desired stronger integration at the EU level in certain policy areas. Their argument is that 
greater application of the subsidiarity principle will strengthen the European nation-
states, and inevitably come at the expense of the EU central level. Thus, this trade-off 
between the “stronger Union vs. effective subsidiarity” has been addressed through 
different mechanisms, which will be presented later in the article. 
Another important issue deals with the democracy and input legitimacy of the proposed 
EU actions. Introducing directly elected national parliaments as guardians of subsidiarity 
along with the EU “legislative triangle” (the European Commission, the Council of 
Ministers, and the European Parliament) bestows more legitimacy on the EU acts. It 
bridges the democratic gap that emerged from the technocratic characteristic of EU 
decision-making, pictured in the unelected Commission with a monopoly of legislative 
initiation, and informal “comitology” and “trialogue” procedures for the adoption and 
implementation of EU regulations as methods of inter-institutional negotiation behind 
closed doors. 
The principle of subsidiarity is moreover inherently intertwined with two other 
fundamental principles essential to EU decision-making,35 with which it jointly forms 
Article 5 TEU, namely the principles of conferral36 and proportionality.37 Their interplay 
is confirmed in the case law of the Court of Justice, which has held that the subsidiarity 
check includes a necessity test, i.e. the element of proportionality.38 Some authors thus 
argue that since there is an evident convergence and functional overlap between the 
                                                        
34 Ibid. 
35 Lenaerts, op. cit. (n. 12), p. 850 and 875. He holds that not only does Article 5 “[determine] conditions that 
must be met for the Union to be able to take action under one of its powers (‘only if’ question, i.e. the 
assessment of the need for EU action or subsidiarity sensu stricto)” but it “also indicates the permissible 
extent of such action (‘insofar as’ question, i.e. the assessment of the nature and intensity of EU action or 
subsidiarity sensu lato)”, which is covered by the proportionality principle. 
36 Article 5(2) TEU: “Under the principle of conferral, the Union shall act only within the limits of the 
competences conferred upon it by the Member States in the Treaties to attain the objectives set out therein. 
Competences not conferred upon the Union in the Treaties remain with the Member States.” 
37 Article 5(4) TEU: “Under the principle of proportionality, the content and form of Union action shall not 
exceed what is necessary to achieve the objectives of the Treaties.” 
38 Louis, J. V., National Parliaments and the Principle of Subsidiarity - Legal Options and Practical Limits, 
European Constitutional Law Review, Vol. 4, No. 3, 2008, p. 443. 
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principles, it will be difficult in practice to separate their scrutiny, and the designated 
procedure for safeguarding the particular principle individually will inevitably come with 
many shortcomings.39 However, an important difference to note is that proportionality, 
unlike subsidiarity, applies even in cases where EU competence is exclusive.40 
As will be assessed in more detail later in this article, the concept of subsidiarity, as a 
multifaceted notion, is normatively filled with both legal and political substance. Thus, 
possible inconsistencies in assessing the principle partially, i.e. only through the lens of 
one or the other approach, further complicate its interpretation and application in 
practice. Academics, legal practitioners and politicians have from the early days 
developed diverging concepts on subjecting the control of application of subsidiarity to a 
particular institution or body, whether national or supranational. Therefore, we have seen 
proposals for judicial (substantive and procedural) guarantees, in contrast to advocating 
the complete exclusion of the principle from the Treaties, and endorsing legislators with 
such responsibility.41 Those who insist on the legal nature of the principle have brought 
forward suggestions for the creation of a special advisory/judicial body, i.e. subsidiarity 
tribunals operating with an ex post legally binding perspective, or a special chamber on 
subsidiarity within the Court of Justice.42 Those advocating the political feature of the 
principle propose the creation of a consultancy committee, formed of national 
parliamentarians or “wise men”.43 Earlier Treaty revisions indeed considered some 
institutional solutions for safeguarding the principle of subsidiarity, but eventually 
avoided them. Here was another compromise on subsidiarity and a trade-off in weighing 
conflicting interests: not burdening the legislative procedure and preserving the 
institutional balance on the one hand, and ensuring a more comprehensive and balanced 
approach on subsidiarity on the other. 
Finally, the Protocol on subsidiarity and proportionality44 attached to the Treaty of Lisbon 
came with guidelines for assessing the subsidiarity-specific justifications of EU-wide 
action. It mandates the EU legislative triangle to ensure compliance with the principle of 
subsidiarity at each stage of the legislative process.45 The Commission, tabling draft 
legislative proposals and justifying EU-level actions in the light of subsidiarity demands, 
must include qualitative and quantitative indicators to “substantiate reasons for 
                                                        
39 Ibid. 
40 Furthermore regarding exclusive EU competences, subsidiarity is important for the maintenance and 
ongoing justification of the principle of the supremacy of EU law, where we have a possible conflict between 
the earlier regulations already in place, and newly-emerged modern regulatory areas where the principle 
of subsidiarity may come into play de novo. See Cygan, op. cit. (n. 5). 
41 Toth, op. cit. (n. 7), p. 270. 
42 Louis, op. cit. (n. 38), p. 435. 
43 Ibid. Some imaginatively went even further and suggested the appointment of a “Mr. or Mrs. Subsidiarity” 
who would serve as one of the Commissioners. 
44 Protocol (No. 2) on the application of the principles of subsidiarity and proportionality, annexed to the 
Treaty on European Union and the Treaty on the Functioning of the European Union by the Treaty of Lisbon 
of 13 December 2007 (2012) OJ C 326, pp. 206-209. 
45 Wyatt, op. cit. (n. 17), pp. 9-10. 
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concluding that a determined objective can better be achieved at the Union level”.46 This 
concerns both the choice of instruments and the content of the proposal.47 The European 
Parliament’s Rules of Procedure likewise provide that “during the examination of a 
proposal for a legislative act, Parliament shall pay particular attention to respect for the 
principle of subsidiarity”.48 These dynamics are further regulated by various inter-
institutional agreements concluded by the Commission, the Council and the Parliament. 
An example is the recent agreement on “Better Law-making”, which mandates the 
Commission to clarify “in its explanatory memoranda how the proposed measures are 
justified in the light of the principle of subsidiarity” and to “take this into account in its 
impact assessments”.49 In these impact assessments, the Commission ought to provide 
“justification for EU action in terms of the need for harmonization, and the [explicit] 
subsidiarity calculus”, which “should in turn facilitate judicial review”.50 We turn to the 
latter in the following part of this article. 
2. 2. Subsidiarity as a legal concept in the case law of the EU Court of Justice  
Procedurally, subsidiarity can be invoked either upon referral from the national courts to 
the Court of Justice in the preliminary ruling procedure or through direct action (for 
infringement). More specifically regarding the latter, Article 8 of the Protocol on 
subsidiarity and proportionality institutionalises the procedure for challenging the 
(non)application of the principle before EU judicial instances. Directly mentioning Article 
263 of the Treaty on the Functioning of the EU (TFEU), it establishes the CJEU’s 
jurisdiction for ruling ex post in actions on the grounds of infringement of the principle of 
subsidiarity by a legislative act.51 
The first important observation in this context relates to the interpretation of the legal 
basis selected for a particular regulatory act. Dependent on this, and on a subsequent 
justification of the regulatory choice, is the Court of Justice’s assessment of subsidiarity 
compliance. However, this may be especially complicated in interrelated and overlapping 
regulatory areas and levels of competence. In other words, pursuing a particular aim 
could be legally sound under one particular legal basis but not under another. The 
problem lies in the uncertainty surrounding certain policy areas – do they fall within or 
outside the sphere of EU competence? Some authors hold that there are in fact no clear 
limitations to the EU’s potential competence. De Burca thus argues that any formally 
                                                        
46 Louis, op. cit. (n. 38), p. 436. 
47 Raffaelli, op. cit. (n. 1). Regarding the choice of the regulatory instruments, it is usually contended that the 
EU has preferred regulation by directives, which are “designed to foster subsidiarity” since they, according 
to Article 288 TFEU, leave space for the national regulatory choice of form and methods for reaching the 
prescribed obligatory goal. See Craig, op. cit. (n. 6), p. 75. 
48 Raffaelli, op. cit. (n. 1). 
49 Ibid. 
50 Craig, op. cit. (n. 6), p. 78. 
51 The same article entrusts the EU Committee of the Regions with a special right to bring such actions, in 
order to safeguard its institutional prerogatives, against legislative acts, regarding the procedures in which 
it ought to participate in its consultancy capacity. 
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established legalistic boundaries would inevitably be in constant shift and change, 
downplaying the practical utilisation of the principle of subsidiarity.52 Moreover, EU-
proposed actions usually envisage multiple objectives to be achieved. Some of those 
objectives may, and others may not, require EU-wide action. This is especially relevant for 
measures allegedly contributing, whether modestly or substantially, to the 
“establishment and functioning of the internal market”.53 Here, balancing of the 
comparability and significance of these goals in relation to those that may be a matter for 
national authorities presents a politically salient issue and ultimately a challenging task 
for the CJEU.54 It is even more difficult to strike a proper balance in situations where an 
EU objective could be sufficiently achieved through regulation at the EU level,55 but some 
other aspects, like implementation, monitoring and enforcement, are better attained at 
the level of Member States.56 
The second important observation relates to the question of justiciability of the 
subsidiarity principle. In more general terms, justiciability implies the following quality 
of a rule or a principle: its judicial enforceability or “solvability” by judicial intervention. 
The classic EU law doctrine would add to this the requirements of sufficient clarity, 
precision and unconditionality. Three comprehensive criteria for assessing whether the 
issue is capable of judicial resolution in the EU are thus proposed: (i) the question of the 
CJEU’s jurisdiction – is it envisaged or not? (ii) the question of admissibility – does an 
action for bringing an issue before the Court exist, and who has the active legitimation to 
bring such action? and (iii) the question of substance – does the Court’s power to 
determine the issue on the merits exist?57 It is asserted that the first two steps comprise 
legal procedural exercises, which are properly vested in the jurisdiction of the Court of 
Justice. On the other hand, the third substantive step comprises a material assessment of 
the objectives of a particular proposed act, and amounts in essence to answering the 
question concerning at which level they are better achieved. It therefore requires “mainly 
political or economic assessments that exceed the proper judicial functions”.58 This third 
criterion represents the crux of the “subsidiarity conundrum” in its legal dimension. In 
the remainder of this part, the main issues that aggravate determining on the merits 
subsidiarity cases are reviewed. These issues determine the subsidiarity principle’s 
justiciability before the CJEU. 
It has been recognised from the outset that, in the formulation and implementation of 
functional or sectoral policies (e.g. internal market regulation), the exercise of EU 
competences involves “an evaluation of complex economic facts and market conditions”.59 
                                                        
52 de Burca, op. cit. (n. 14), p. 19. 
53 Such as, for instance, in the Tobacco Advertising case, C-376/98 Germany v. European Parliament and the 
Council ECLI:EU:C:2000:544. 
54 Wyatt, op. cit. (n. 17), p. 9. 
55 Craig, op. cit. (n. 6), p. 75. 
56 Ibid. 
57 Toth, op. cit. (n. 7), p. 279. 
58 Ibid, p. 280. 
59 Ibid. 
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Within the EU institutional architecture, the CJEU was deemed unsuitable in terms of 
“staff, facilities and expertise” to examine whether the proposal is “good, appropriate or 
adequate” and thereby undertake research to deliver “complex economic and political 
judgments”.60 The scenario in which the Court would nevertheless use its discretion in 
substantively assessing the objectives of proposed EU acts opens the floor for judicial 
activism and law-making. The Court of Justice has indeed been strongly accused of such 
practice.61 In effect, it amounts to replacing the legislative discretion of the Commission, 
the Council and the Parliament under the guise of judicial review, thus interfering with 
the principles of separation of powers and institutional balance in the EU.  
The judicial activism objection seems particularly important regarding the principle of 
subsidiarity. In certain instances, the CJEU, through its jurisprudence, has arguably 
enlarged EU powers, e.g. by defining the principles of implicit and pre-emptive 
competences.62 This might explain in part the Court’s restrictive approach to assessing 
the compliance of EU acts with subsidiarity. It has been argued that despite the CJEU’s 
declared intention to approach subsidiarity-policing in a balanced and neutral way, its 
position is rather “one-sided” in favour of EU competence. In reality, the Court faces a 
“conflict between the constitutional imperative to be neutral between Member States and 
the [Union], and the law which gives shape and existence to the Court and its 
jurisdiction”.63 The outcome of this conflict – so it is suggested – will inevitably lead to 
greater leeway for the EU regulator. 
Similarly, subsidiarity has tended to diminish in importance in the CJEU’s jurisprudence 
when faced with the Court’s logic of “economic constitutionalism” coupled with 
integrationist and expansionist bias.64 In selected examples,65 de Burca argued that there 
is the obvious phenomenon of the Court refusing to engage with the subsidiarity 
argumentation, by assessing or questioning the appropriateness of the EU economic 
norms in light of their aims and the principle of effectiveness. Such a position of the Court 
ultimately leads to the encroachment of the EU’s regulation into areas of national 
competences originally intended to stay outside its reach. How does the CJEU justify its 
position? First, it opts for a strict textual interpretation of economic rules as being 
                                                        
60 Ibid. This account, however, disregarded the added value of contributions of the parties to the proceedings 
and representatives of various interveners (Member States’ governments and institutions), together with 
the assistance of the Advocates General, for the Court’s capacity to effectively assess these issues. 
61 Davies, op. cit. (n. 4), p. 65. The argument is that if a situation requires the CJEU to “consider alternatives”, 
it will inevitably be involved in “policy-making considerations”. 
62 Mataija, op. cit. (n. 2), p. 151. 
63 Davies, op. cit. (n. 4), p. 66. 
64 This means that the Court “prioritize[d] and privilege[d] market liberalization norms” while adopting EU-
friendly interpretation of the division of competences. See de Burca, op. cit. (n. 14), p. 37. Only recently has 
this characterisation of the CJEU as “pro-integrationist” been challenged, but with no immediate changes in 
the Court’s approach to subsidiarity. 
65 In the earlier case law, prior to the introduction of subsidiarity into the Treaties, see, for instance, Case 
9/74 Casagrande ECLI:EU:C:1974:74, and Case 65/81 Reina ECLI:EU:C:1982:6. For a post-Maastricht 
example of the Court refusing to engage with subsidiarity argumentation, see Case C-415/93 Bosman 
ECLI:EU:C:1995:463. 
More in de Burca, op. cit. (n. 14), pp. 37-38. 
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inherently far reaching. The implication of this is that no area of domestic policy, even 
exclusive national competences, can ever be definitively understood as being “beyond the 
reach of the EU’s economic norms”.66 Therefore, what the Court did is to affirm and 
repeatedly support what is essentially an irrefutable presumption: the objectives of 
internal market measures can only be better achieved at the EU level.67 The argument 
often entertained by the CJEU is that any differences in the Member States’ laws are likely 
to cause distortions in competition and thus erect barriers to the effective functioning of 
the EU market.68 Such a judicial construct in effect undermined the practical value of 
subsidiarity in the Court’s assessments – it lost all strength when faced with market 
priorities. 
The Court’s perspective on subsidiarity can be conceptualised as follows. Imagine a 
harmonising measure being challenged for annulment. A Member State bringing the 
challenge would have to establish that a regulated area – for instance, occupational 
safety,69 public health,70 or food safety,71 all primarily national competences – would be 
just as well (or even better) regulated by the Member States acting alone; therefore, 
subsidiarity should prevent the EU from acting.72 However, the goals of those “challenged 
or interpreted [measures] are not exclusively, generally not even primarily, that of 
regulating the substantive area of law in question”; instead, the goal is pursuing “one of 
the [EU’s] functional competences – in most cases it is removing obstacles to free 
movement or distortions of competition”.73 The Court would then accept the necessity of 
the EU harmonising measure for attaining the stated goals, “since it is manifestly the case 
that Member States acting alone will never be able to achieve the goals pursued by 
harmonization, and hence there is no subsidiarity criticism to be made”.74 This way, there 
was a risk of subsidiarity becoming redundant and irrelevant altogether, since, where 
uniformity is deemed necessary for the functioning of the internal market, only the EU 
would be able to act.75 Such an option would run counter to the intention of the creators 
of the Treaties: there was a reason why the functional competences, including the internal 
                                                        
66 Ibid, p. 39. In other places, the author puts it differently: it is “virtually impossible to assert with confidence 
whether there exist a policy area which completely remains outside the EU regulatory grip”. 
67 See, for example, Case C-491/01 British American Tobacco ECLI:EU:C:2002:741, para. 180, as cited in 
Wyatt, op. cit. (n. 17), p. 11. 
68 Few authors have recognised this as problematic, even before the subsidiarity principle was incorporated 
in the Treaties. They claimed that since only the EU could adopt market harmonisation measures, the 
internal market competences should be enlisted as exclusive EU competences. Therefore, subsidiarity could 
not be applicable to the exercise of these powers. These views were eventually rejected in the final version 
of the Treaty of Maastricht, which designated the internal market as a competence shared between the EU 
and Member States, where it has remained until today. For more, see Toth, A. G., The Principle of Subsidiarity 
in the Maastricht Treaty, Common Market Law Review, Vol. 29, No. 6, 1992, p. 1079. 
69 Case C-84/94 UK v. Council (Working Time Directive) ECLI:EU:C:1996:431. 
70 British American Tobacco, op. cit. (n. 67). 
71 Case C-154/04 Alliance for Natural Health ECLI:EU:C:2005:449; Case C-377/98 Netherlands v. Parliament 
and Council (Biotechnology Directive) ECLI:EU:C:2001:523. 
72 Davies, op. cit. (n 4), p. 73. 
73 Ibid. 
74 Ibid, p. 74. 
75 Ibid. 
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market, where “national and EU powers become inextricably entwined”, were 
constitutionally envisaged as shared competences where a subsidiarity check is intended 
to apply.76 
In any event, what indeed happened in the early case law, in which the CJEU explicitly 
engaged in assessing the legislative proposals in the light of the principle of subsidiarity, 
was the Court’s adoption of in general restrictive yet inconsistent interpretation of 
subsidiarity. This was a standard critique coming from the legal commentators. An almost 
unanimous claim was that the “EU courts do not take subsidiarity seriously” but rather 
engage in a “low-intensity judicial review of the principle”.77 This was due to both 
objective difficulties to operationalise the vague legal principle and the Court’s refusal to 
engage in strict and homogeneous subsidiarity scrutiny.78 Another “political” explanation 
for the Court’s avoidance of wrestling with the justiciability of subsidiarity is its alleged 
deference to the Union legislators. In simple terms, the Court respects the nature and 
outcomes of EU decision-making, where the act is adopted if a qualified majority backs it 
in the Council and hence implicitly rejects any subsidiarity-related objections.79 All these 
observations will be further addressed when particular cases are discussed below. 
Since many uncertainties regarding subsidiarity in the judicial process have remained, a 
decision on the aims and appropriateness of the proposed EU action has shifted more 
towards the political arena.80 In the post-Lisbon era, subsidiarity is still considered by 
many as not justiciable in its entirety, despite being laid down in the Treaty. Put 
differently, although constitutionally articulated, the principle of subsidiarity is not 
normatively “filled with substance”. This is why it was hitherto interpreted and 
                                                        
76 Ibid, p. 75. 
77 This notwithstanding the lack of research on how many subsidiarity cases have actually been brought 
before the Court of Justice since the constitutionalisation of the principle. See Craig, op. cit. (n. 6), p. 80. 
Furthermore, Craig has estimated that in more than twenty years after the subsidiarity was introduced in 
the Treaty of Maastricht, there have been only around a dozen cases dealing with genuine subsidiarity 
challenges. Comparing that with the vast amount of EU regulation during the same period, he concludes that 
it demonstrates the limitation of the Court’s assessment of the legal dimension of subsidiarity. 
78 The latter position of the CJEU was seen in the Tobacco Advertising case, op. cit. (n. 53). The German 
government initiated an action before the Court following the subsidiarity objections raised by the 
Bundestag. However, the Court did not delve deeper into the question of subsidiarity. It rather annulled an 
EU directive for the reason of an improper legal basis, even though there were references to the question of 
the level of governance at which the action could be better performed. This judgment seems to indicate that 
where an EU act is found invalid for whatever reason, the subsidiarity issue will not arise and be taken into 
consideration in proceedings before the Court. Since subsidiarity sets a limit on the exercise of EU 
competence, the assessment of subsidiary is unnecessary when there is no competence to act at all. I am 
grateful to an anonymous reviewer for drawing my attention to this last point. 
79 Craig, op. cit. (n. 6), p. 81. He holds that the reason for the “relative lack of [subsidiarity] challenges, and 
the weakness of the challenges [brought before he Court]”, lie in the fact that the act’s “enactment attests 
that there was a sufficient number of Member States to secure a qualified majority, which believed that 
action at EU level was required in accordance with the subsidiarity calculus”. Thus, Member States that base 
their legal action principally on subsidiarity infringement will have to face opposition by Member States 
intervening before the Court and contending that action at the EU level was indeed warranted, as confirmed 
by their vote in favour of the adoption of the contested act. 
80 Constantin, op. cit. (n. 13), p. 152. 
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understood primarily as a political “brake” to breaches of competence at the Union level.81 
The political dimension of subsidiarity is increasingly being highlighted, while its legal 
character remains questionable. Therefore, the situation has not changed much since 
perhaps the most famous criticism of the judicial assessment of the principle of subsidiary 
was delivered. The then-President of the Court of Justice, Lord Mackenzie Stuart, termed 
subsidiarity as a “rich and prime example of ‘gobbledygook’ which simultaneously 
embraces two opposed concepts”,82 i.e. the political and the legal.83 As it turns out, the 
CJEU did not manage to make the term more comprehensible. 
To the author’s knowledge, there have still been no judgments on the annulment of EU 
acts for breaching the subsidiarity principle.84 As mentioned before, subsidiarity has 
appeared before the CJEU only in a limited number of cases. It has been invoked by the 
parties, rather unsuccessfully, either as a reason for requesting annulment or as an aid for 
interpretation of EU legislation. On the other hand, the Court has only gradually and 
timidly come to address subsidiarity in its case law. The very first hint that the principle 
might be justiciable, at least in principle, came in the case United Kingdom v. Council.85 The 
judgment was welcomed with the caution that subsidiarity is “justiciable, although not 
with mathematical certainty”.86 However, can we ever consider a principle as fully 
justiciable if it cannot be definitively and “with mathematical certainty” interpreted and 
applied? The CJEU’s consistently simplistic and vague argumentation,87 as reiterated in 
                                                        
81 Zalewska, M. & Gstrein, O. J., National Parliaments and their Role in European Integration: The EU‘s 
Democratic Deficit in Times of Economic Hardship and Political Insecurity, Bruges Political Research Papers, 
No. 28, 2013, p. 24., available at: https://www.coleurope.eu/study/european-political-and-administrative-
studies/research-publications/bruges-political-research. 
82 Jensen & Martinsen, op. cit. (n. 3), p. 14. Oxford Living Dictionaries (https://en.oxforddictionaries.com/) 
define “gobbledygook” as “language that is meaningless or is made unintelligible by excessive use of 
technical terms”. 
83 The same was subsequently criticised by many authors as an attempt to elevate the maxim of sound 
administration and a policy principle into a legal rule, or in other words to turn a “rule of institutional 
conduct into a fundamental [legal] principle of the EU law”. See Constantin, op. cit. (n. 13), p. 158. 
84 In theory, a binding EU act failing to comply with an essential procedural requirement related to the 
application of the principle of subsidiarity is a more likely possibility than its annulment for manifest error 
of assessment. See Wyatt, op. cit. (n. 17), p. 12. Cf. with the already discussed difference in subsidiarity’s 
formal/substantive as opposed to its procedural dimension, in Toth, op. cit. (n. 7), p. 279-280. 
85 Case C-84/94 UK v. Council (Working Time Directive), op. cit. (n. 69). 
86 Constantin, op. cit. (n. 13), p. 163. 
87 A more detailed example of the Court’s reserved approach towards subsidiarity is the early judgment in 
the Case C-233/94 Germany v. European Parliament and the Council ECLI:EU:C:1997:231. Answering, and 
eventually rejecting, the German government’s plea on infringement that the adopted directive did not 
contain a thorough explanation of how it was compatible with the principle of subsidiarity, the Court held 
that: “in the Union legislature’s view, the aim of its action could, because of the dimensions of the intended 
action, be best achieved at Community level” (para. 26, emphasis added). The Court then found that in 
response to the Commission’s earlier recommendations via national measures, Member States did not fully 
achieve the desired result. Thus, it was concluded that the “objective of its action could not be achieved 
sufficiently by the Member States” (para. 27). Consequently, the Court viewed it as “apparent that the 
Parliament and the Council did explain why they considered that their action was in conformity with the 
principle of subsidiarity, and that an express reference to that principle cannot be required” (para. 28, 
emphasis added). 
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the more recent Inuit case,88 has kept raising objections to the principle’s full justiciability. 
The Court primarily observes compliance with subsidiarity as one of the conditions 
covered by the requirement to state reasons for EU acts.89 However, even then it takes a 
restricted and undemanding approach and simply checks whether motivation has been 
indicated in the preamble of the adopted legal acts.90 The Court will find the requirement 
to be satisfied if “it is clear from reading the recitals that the principle has been complied 
with”.91 
On the other hand, the Advocate General in the Vodafone case92 proposed to the Court not 
to consider the “legislative authority’s intent” as an exclusive guarantee of a “sufficient 
justification” that warrants action by the Union.93 In the subsequent judgment, the Court 
moved away from reading only the preamble to taking an “indirect account of the relevant 
impact assessment to establish the grounds [for EU action], which are largely based on 
the transnational nature of the proposed action”.94 Nevertheless, in recent cases the Court 
came back to a more formalistic and reserved assessment of subsidiarity compliance 
when it affirmed its mandate to verify only “whether the Union legislator was entitled to 
consider, on the basis of a detailed statement, that the objective of the proposed action 
could be better achieved at Union level”.95 
What can, if anything, be concluded from these examples of the CJEU’s inconsistent 
examination of the compliance of EU regulatory practice with the principle of 
subsidiarity? First, the Court usually does not require a detailed explanation of the 
proposed legislation. It is enough that the EU institutions claim that for some reason 
national legislation seems inadequate and that Union action brings added value. As 
previously elaborated, this remains highly problematic, especially in the internal market 
sphere. By default, there exists a presumption that the EU is the only one able to efficiently 
harmonise and ensure the functioning of the internal market, while the Member States on 
their own are unable to do so. The Court’s apologists defend such “judicial scrutiny of the 
appropriateness of reasons” invoked in favour of the EU action as the only “practical route 
                                                        
88 Case T-526/10 Inuit ECLI:EU:T:2013:215, paras. 79-86; appealed Case C-398/13 P Inuit 
ECLI:EU:C:2015:535. 
89 Wyatt, op. cit. (n. 17), pp. 11-12. 
90 Constantin, op. cit. (n. 13), p. 163. 
91 Raffaelli, op. cit. (n. 1). 
92 Case C-58/08 Vodafone, Opinion of the Advocate General Maduro ECLI:EU:C:2009:596, as cited in 
Raffaelli, op. cit. (n. 1). 
93 Ibid. 
94 Ibid. 
95 C-547/14 Philipp Morris EU:C:2016:325, para. 218. 
Along these lines of the Court’s lenient approach is the judgment in the ESMA case (C-270/12 UK v. European 
Parliament and the Council ECLI:EU:C:2014:18). There, the Court formalistically accepted that the objectives 
of the proposed action through the established EU agency could not be sufficiently achieved by the Member 
States individually, without going into a more detailed analysis of that proposition. It additionally confirmed 
that the regulation in question placed enough criteria and limitations for judicial review and political control 
of the exercise of the EU authority in question, meaning that the powers vested in the agency were 
compatible with the Treaties. For more details, see Tridimas, T., Financial Supervision and Agency Power: 
Reflections on ESMA, in:  Shuibhne, N. N. & Gormley, L. W. (Eds.), From Single Market to Economic Union: 
Essays in Memory of John A Usher, Oxford University Papers, 2012. 
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for the Court of Justice to supervise the respect by the political institutions [of the 
subsidiarity requirements]”.96 Second, the annulments of EU acts for breaches of the 
subsidiarity principle are hardly expected. The CJEU recognises the EU decision-makers’ 
“wide discretion or margin of appreciation in making complex policy assessments”97 
when deciding on the appropriate level of action for achieving the designated aims. Third, 
the Court at the same time tries to safeguard its institutional status as an ultimate 
adjudicator and interpreter of EU law. Albeit marginally, it preserves the entitlement to 
examine the “accuracy of the findings of fact and law in the acts involving complex 
assessments, and [to] address the question whether the objective of the proposed action 
could be better achieved at the EU level”.98 However, due to the political sensitivity 
attached to subsidiarity, the Court maintains a cautious approach even concerning the 
procedural scrutiny of the principle.99 The Court’s undemanding approach led to a low 
threshold for satisfying subsidiarity’s procedural requirements of stating and 
substantiating reasons in favour of EU action. This remains unsatisfactory not least 
because “texts of explanatory memoranda accompanying legislative proposals invariably 
contain brief and self-serving references to subsidiarity, as do references to subsidiarity 
in the preambles of legislation”.100 The Court’s approach lays the greatest burden for 
ensuring compliance with subsidiarity on the Commission, which holds the monopoly of 
legislative initiation. However, the Commission’s motivation to dedicate full attention to 
procedural requirements has remained strongly questionable, possibly due to its limited 
capacity and institutional constraints to engage thoroughly with subsidiarity assessment. 
After all, the Commission itself is of the opinion that although subsidiarity has application 
in law, it remains an “essentially political principle”.101  
As a final remark, the Court of Justice’s case law on subsidiarity seems largely to uphold 
the initial argument of the principle being justiciable only to a “certain point and subject 
to restrictions”.102 This may be the result of either internal judicial reservations, uncertain 
                                                        
96 Lenaerts, op. cit. (n. 12), p. 894. The argument goes that the EU political institutions, faced with the 
possibility of a “direct ‘political’ control of the Member States, their subnational authorities and interested 
citizens”, will be “forced to think thoroughly before acting” and will thus invest effort to “express the 
[appropriate and convincing] reasoning with regards to the operation of subsidiarity as limit intra vires to 
[the Union’s] action”. 
97 Wyatt, op. cit. (n. 17), p. 11. 
98 Case British American Tobacco, op. cit. (n. 67), para. 180. 
99 Wyatt, op. cit. (n. 17), p. 12. 
100 Ibid. 
101 Constantin, op. cit. (n. 13), p. 161. The EU political institutions have similarly taken on the scope of 
subsidiarity. The Commission held at the very beginning that subsidiarity “is first and foremost a political 
principle, a sort of rule of reason. Its function is not to distribute powers. That is a matter for the authors of 
the Treaty. The aim of the subsidiarity principle is, rather, to regulate the exercise of powers and to justify 
their use in a particular case”. The European Council also remarked early that “the principle of subsidiarity 
does not relate to and cannot call into question the powers conferred on the [EU] by the Treaty as 
interpreted by the Court. The acquis communautaire as well as the balance between the [Union] institutions 
do not therefore come under pressure as a consequence of the statement of the principle of subsidiarity in 
the Treaty. There is no separate decision on subsidiarity preceding the decision on the substance of [Union] 
action. Subsidiarity and substance are necessarily and inextricably intertwined and thus must be part of a 
single decision-making process”. For more details, see Lenaerts, op. cit. (n. 12), pp. 893-894. 
102 Toth, op. cit. (n. 7), p. 272. 
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delineation of exclusive and shared competences, or external shortcomings of 
subsidiarity’s legal framework, even after the introduction of a distinct procedure in the 
Protocol on subsidiarity and proportionality specifically designed for bringing 
subsidiarity issues to the Court’s ex post assessment. Therefore, the subsidiarity check in 
the form of a judicial procedure proved to have a rather limited influence on EU law-
making practices, both substantially (regarding the quality of proposals in light of the 
appropriateness of the action) and quantitatively (the frequency and amount of Union-
level regulation).103 Three reasons for this outcome were offered: (i) failures in the 
substantial and procedural design of the principle; (ii) political indifference towards the 
principle or even “antipathy on the part of the EU institutions and some Member States”; 
and (iii) “constitutional indifference or antipathy on the part of the Court of Justice”.104 
This led some authors to argue that the judicial review of subsidiarity is defective, since 
the principle itself is ill-suited to provide legal answers to the political problems of the 
demarcation of competences. For them, it essentially remains “the wrong rule, in the 
wrong place, at the wrong time”, which “serves primarily as a masking principle, 
presenting a centralizing polity in a decentralizing light”.105 
However, such a bleak and fatalistic depiction of subsidiarity does not suffice in itself. A 
reflection on this criticism is indeed necessary to concretise and refine the status of 
subsidiarity before the CJEU and to look for possible ways forward. This is important for 
ensuring the interests of legal certainty, institutional trustworthiness, consistency in the 
Court’s case law, principles of good administration and inter-institutional balance, and 
more democratic and inclusive decision-making in the EU. All these interests are laudable 
and worth pursuing, notwithstanding the unsatisfactory record of the judicial oversight 
of subsidiarity that is unlikely to improve significantly in the near future.106 Seeking to 
address these challenges by striking an appropriate balance between judicial control and 
the political safeguarding of subsidiarity, the EU entrusted national parliaments with 
responsibility to monitor the application of the principle in the pre-legislative stages of 
EU decision-making. This political procedure, to which we turn in the following part, 
arrived with the promise of reinforcing and provoking an appropriate judicial response 
to subsidiarity, and thus of “increasing the accountability and legitimacy of the EU law-
                                                        
103 Actually, the amount of EU regulation has decreased recently. However, this was due to neither the 
increased judicial scrutiny of the principle of subsidiarity, nor the national parliaments’ engagement in 
policing compliance with the principle, as will be explained in the following part. It was rather the result of 
the Junker Commission’s new general strategy of “better regulation”, i.e. smaller in amount but greater in 
impact, as a response to political crises in the EU and a lack of popular support for EU regulatory initiatives. 
See European Commission, Speech of the President Jean-Claude Juncker – State of the Union Address, 2017, 
available at http://europa.eu/rapid/press-release_SPEECH-17-3165_en.htm. 
104 Wyatt, op. cit. (n. 17), p. 4. 
105 Davies, op. cit. (no. 4), p. 66 and p. 77. Davies argues that subsidiarity’s main shortcoming is that “instead 
of providing a method to balance between Member State and [EU] interests, it assumes the [primacy of EU] 
goals, absolutely privileges their achievement, and simply asks who should be the one to do the 
implementing work” (pp. 67–8). For a critique of Davies’ argument, see Craig, op. cit. (n. 6). 
106 Craig, op. cit. (n. 6), p. 84. 
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makers, [while] in an unprecedented way enhancing the sense of ‘ownership’ of the 
European project at national level”.107 
2. 3. Subsidiarity as a political concept in the Early Warning System mechanism 
exercised by the national parliaments  
National parliaments were for a long time seen as the main losers and victims of the EU’s 
deepening integration project, which favoured the national executives, and the Council 
and the European Parliament at the supranational level.108 Theses of the “de-
democratisation” and “de-national-parliamentarisation” of the EU, both substantive – 
national parliaments losing their competences, and procedural – national parliaments 
being left outside EU decision-making, were employed for explanations.109 Therefore, 
national parliaments as domestic sovereigns ceded regulatory powers to the EU. Political 
balance shifted away from them with a growing number of policy areas being regulated 
at the EU level and procedures of supranational decision-making increasingly being used. 
The national parliaments hence appeared as mere spectators in EU political life and acted 
as “rubber-stampers” of the proposals being mailed to them from Brussels.110 
The Working Group on Subsidiarity at the Constitutional Convention on the Future of 
Europe, which drafted the infamous Treaty Establishing a Constitution for Europe, 
recognised that subsidiarity is substantively of a political nature, its implementation 
includes a wide margin of discretion, and therefore the monitoring compliance-ensuring 
procedure should be conducted through an ex ante political mechanism.111 The Lisbon 
Treaty, which built upon these findings, therefore came as a paradigm-changer in this 
respect, at least formally. Protocols attached to the final version of the Treaty contained 
references to the new role of national parliaments in EU decision-making. This introduced 
a certain shift from the judicial oversight of subsidiarity to parliamentary policing of the 
principle. The above-described weak and perplexed ex post judicial control of subsidiarity 
has been reinforced with an ex ante political mechanism for increased scrutiny of the 
principle.112 At the time, it was enthusiastically described as an “indication of, or a way to, 
a paradigm shift towards a kind of polycentric Union”.113 With these novelties in place, 
the EU aimed at increasing the input and output legitimacy of Union-level actions through 
the newly established collective subsidiarity monitoring mechanism. 
National parliaments after Lisbon hence possess twofold privilege. It embodies in them 
elements of both institutional approaches for safeguarding subsidiarity: ex ante political 
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control through the Early Warning System (“EWS”), and the ex post legal control through 
mandating their governments to initiate infringement proceedings before the CJEU. The 
latter option in general has remained a major political issue for the majority of national 
governments given the usual resistance on their part to allow access to the Court for other 
national institutions or decentralised entities other than themselves.114 For this reason, 
the former political procedure has come into focus.  
Before the Lisbon developments, domestic ministerial scrutiny and holding the national 
executive accountable were the dominant influence of national parliaments on European 
affairs. Nowadays, domestic legislatures have as a matter of principle an interest in 
retaining competences at domestic level, and in acting as a “decentralizing corrective vis-
à-vis Brussels” by exercising their prerogatives.115 These new powers granted to national 
parliaments by the Protocol on subsidiarity and proportionality allow them precisely to 
do so. More specifically, the EWS mechanism gives them a powerful tool to object to an 
EU proposal on the grounds that it breaches the principle of subsidiarity. If a sufficient 
number of national parliaments object, the proposal has to be reviewed, and may 
consequently be maintained, amended or withdrawn by the Commission or blocked by 
the European Parliament or the Council. This procedure will be explained in more detail 
below. The Protocol also provides that, in the case of a breach of the principle of 
subsidiarity, the Committee of the Regions or the Member State(s) may challenge the 
adopted act directly before the CJEU.116 
The most important procedure in this context – the EWS mechanism – is exercised 
collectively by all national parliaments in the EU acting through a specific voting 
system.117 Within the ordinary legislative procedure, any national parliament or 
parliamentary chamber (in the case of bicameral national legislators) may object to a draft 
legislative act by submitting a “reasoned opinion” within eight weeks from receiving the 
draft proposal. In that opinion, reasons for considering why the draft act does not comply 
with subsidiarity are stated. When the votes are counted, each national parliament is 
allocated two votes, whereas bicameral parliaments split the votes between the 
chambers.118 If reasoned opinions against an EU draft act represent at least one-third (the 
threshold in the area of freedom, security and justice is one quarter) of the total number 
of votes allocated to national parliaments and their chambers, a so-called “yellow card” is 
issued. If over half of the legislatures issue an opinion, an “orange card” is instituted. The 
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However, the self-proclaimed “guardian of the principle of subsidiarity” remains on the margins of the decision-
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consequence of these actions, borrowing their name from football jargon, is explained 
below. The institution from which the act originates – in the majority of situations the 
Commission – must review its proposal. Afterwards, the initiator may decide to maintain, 
amend or withdraw the draft proposal, providing a reason for the decision. 
Although national parliaments cannot expressly block a legislative proposal but only 
provoke a review, the objections raised by a significant number of national parliaments 
could have great influence on the institution from which the proposal originates. It is hard 
to imagine that, for example, the Commission would completely disregard the objections 
from the national parliaments and risk a political backlash.119 However, if the Commission 
decides to maintain the proposal unchanged, it has to submit its own reasoned opinion 
explaining why the proposal complies with subsidiarity in its view. Before concluding the 
first reading in the legislative procedure, the EU co-legislators will have to consider the 
reasoned opinion of the Commission and those of the national parliaments within a 
special procedure, and subsequently decide whether the proposal complies with 
subsidiarity.120 If a majority of 55 percent of the members of the Council or, alternatively, 
a majority of the votes cast in the European Parliament opine that the legislative proposal 
is not compatible with subsidiarity, it will not be given further consideration. 
As previously mentioned, the Protocol on subsidiarity and proportionality also 
designated reinforced judicial control, whereas national parliaments (via their respective 
governments) may decide to bring a case to the CJEU in order to adjudicate a possible 
breach of subsidiarity ex post. This (as of yet unprecedented) scenario is often referred to 
as the “red card”.121 A direct “red card” by national parliaments was discussed but 
nevertheless rejected since the very inception of the EWS mechanisms in order to 
preserve the constitutional prerogative of the Commission over legislative initiation, and 
of the Council over unanimous amendment of the Commission’s proposals.122 
The first eight years of the EWS’s application have shed some light on its usefulness and 
shortcomings. In total, the mechanism has been successfully triggered only three times. 
In 2012, the very first “yellow card” was issued against the Commission’s proposal for a 
                                                        
119 The early indications showed that the Commission is willing to take into account opinions submitted by 
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achieve-in-its-eu-renegotiation/. 
309  ZPR 6 (3) 2017; 287-318 
regulation concerning trade union rights and the right to strike (the so-called Monti II 
Regulation). Twelve out of forty national parliaments or chambers thereof (19 out of 54 
of the total votes allocated) considered that the content of the proposal did not conform 
to the principle of subsidiarity.123 The Commission subsequently dropped the proposal. 
However, the Commission took the view that the subsidiarity principle had not been 
infringed, but rather that it was aware of the lack of the necessary political support for the 
proposal in the Council and the Parliament.124 In 2013, another “yellow card” was issued 
by fourteen chambers of national parliaments in eleven Member States (18 votes in total) 
following the proposal for a regulation on the establishment of the European Public 
Prosecutor’s Office (“EPPO”).125 After examining the reasoned opinions received from the 
national parliaments, which are traditionally sensitive to any attempt of harmonising 
national criminal justice systems, the Commission decided to maintain the proposal, 
stating that, in line with the subsidiarity principle, it would “probably be implemented 
through enhanced cooperation”.126 Finally, in 2016, the third and so far last “yellow card” 
was issued again by fourteen chambers in eleven Member States, in protest against the 
proposal for a revision of the Posted Workers Directive.127 Unsurprisingly, the 
Commission again decided to proceed with the proposal, arguing that the posting of 
workers between different Member States is in essence a transnational issue, and 
therefore in accordance with the principle of subsidiarity. This issue remains to be 
resolved.128 
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reached an agreement on reforming the Posted Workers Directive. The Council thus endorsed the 
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overcomes divisions on posted workers, EUobserver, 2017, available at: 
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no new arguments from Member States that the EU cannot legislate in this area due to a breach of the 
subsidiarity principle. 
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The EWS was initially considered as a welcome novelty addressing two separate issues in 
an optimal and “median” way: it offered a technical response to the question of 
subsidiarity control and inclusion of national parliaments in EU affairs, without further 
“complicating the institutional structure and burdening the legislative procedure”.129 It 
was also underpinned by the idea of facilitating multi-level dialogue and inclusive EU 
decision-making, fostering the culture of European debate, and ensuring the existence of 
a functioning and tolerant “constitutional pluralism” and advanced multi-level 
governance. However, the new mechanism was plagued with many difficulties that 
diminished its practical value and resulted in a negligible number of successful 
applications. The majority of national parliaments proved to be ineffective in conducting 
pre-legislative scrutiny of EU acts for different reasons. Some of these structural 
shortcomings were identified in the literature at the very beginning and remain relevant 
in the present context.130 The first group of problems relates to internal institutional 
elements, e.g. the limited availability of personnel and resources in national parliaments 
for their engagement in subsidiarity monitoring. The second group relates to the internal 
political situation, e.g. the lack of general interest of national parliamentarians in 
European affairs. The third group relates to the shortcomings of the mechanism itself, e.g. 
the inadequate procedure for issuing reasoned opinions, or insufficient horizontal 
coordination between the national parliaments. 
One particular internal issue, initially considered as perhaps the greatest political 
challenge for the new mechanism, was the power-plays between the national parliaments 
and their respective governments. Introducing this parallel channel to voice a national 
position through national parliaments, possibly divergent from the Member State’s 
position communicated by the respective government through the core procedure in the 
Council, was seen as a risk for the EU political arena which was designated as a “political 
football field in a domestic dispute between the government and the parliament”.131 
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130 These problems of the political monitoring of subsidiarity, which render the exercise of the EWS 
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131 Louis, op. cit. (n. 38), p. 44. This critique pointed to the problem of the overlapping national polity’s 
interests: if national representatives in the Council that are directly accountable to national legislators have 
an opportunity to influence both formal and substantive elements of legislative proposals, what is the 
purpose of including the national parliaments’ critical voice? In other words, reflecting on the intention to 
somehow further tackle the problem of democratic deficit in EU law-making, the question was raised 
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However, from this time distance, it seems that this particular scenario has not 
materialised. On the contrary, what has been demonstrated is the domination of the 
executive (even weaker coalition governments) over the legislative branches in many EU 
Member States, and the ability of the former to either domestically maintain consensus 
over EU issues in their national parliaments, or to completely exclude national legislators 
from having a say on EU affairs. The aforementioned lack of subsidiarity objections by 
national parliaments suggests that they have not only remained rather isolated from EU 
decision-making, but also that the EWS has not given them any new leverage over their 
domestic executives. 
Conceptually, national parliaments using the EWS mechanism resemble a French-style 
Conseil constitutionnel, acting as a quasi-institutional organ alongside the EU legislative 
triangle and “exercising an advisory role in the EU legislative process”.132 However, a 
substantive critique of the mechanism asserts that within this procedure national 
parliaments enter the arena of judicial assessment of lawfulness. In this uncharted 
territory, they issue opinions on the proposals’ compliance with subsidiarity, rather than 
political desirability, which would be a typical consultative task of a council of state. In the 
EWS, the formal admissibility check is based on the legal criteria, contrary to the policy 
analysis that discusses the political desirability of legislation (i.e. the necessity and 
effectiveness of the law).133 In favour of this argument is the finding that national 
parliaments usually challenge the justification rather than the merit of the proposal when 
assessing its compliance with subsidiarity. Since the Parliament and the Council often 
significantly amend the Commission’s proposals later in the process in a way not 
presented before the national parliaments, it was proposed that under the EWS a formal 
check of justification be performed, rather than a content of proposals.134 In the present 
system, national parliaments “keep engaging in a legal review, behave in a court-like 
manner, and attempt to use subsidiarity as a legal principle”.135 Put differently, it is the 
wrong procedure involving the wrong actors. 
Confirming this criticism, one of the first studies of the application of the EWS mechanism 
indeed demonstrated that national parliaments misused it and overstepped their 
assigned mandate.136 The analysis of the first successful “yellow card” showed that 
national parliaments failed to identify any subsidiarity violation in the proposed 
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regulation but rather “reacted to an issue of great political saliency”.137 They instead 
assessed and commented on “other aspects of the proposal, such as the legal basis, 
violation of the principle of proportionality or its content”.138 The Commission’s proposal 
had “raised a number of critical questions regarding its content and legal basis, but could 
not be attacked on grounds of subsidiarity concerns since it addressed an issue – 
transnational labour disputes – that by definition falls outside the regulatory powers of 
individual Member States”.139 Thus, the EWS in effect presents national parliaments with 
a possibility to perform a “negative” constitutional check on the EU legislative 
initiatives.140 In other words, they have the authority to put the “brakes” on EU legislative 
proposals and justify their actions with a legal-constitutional rationale. Arguably, this is 
not an appropriate function for national parliaments to perform. It, in addition, draws 
their resources away from the core democratic functions – controlling their national 
governments and retaining direct links with their citizens.141 Therefore, from both the 
external (regarding the efficiency of supranational decision-making) and internal 
(regarding national democratic processes) perspective, the EWS mechanism seems 
displaced. 
In conclusion, the political scrutiny of subsidiarity operated by the national parliaments 
in practice has proved to have an extremely limited influence on EU law-making, both 
substantially (regarding the quality of proposals in light of the subsidiarity requirements) 
and quantitatively (the frequency and amount of EU regulation).142 This observation is 
remarkably similar to the conclusion on the judicial safeguarding of subsidiarity offered 
in the previous part. Various academic contributions referred to in this article have almost 
consensually held that national parliaments, when performing a legal check through the 
EWS, assess whether the EU has competence to engage in a certain regulatory practice. 
This practice amounts to a constitutional function that would be better performed, 
individually or collectively, by either the EU courts, national constitutional courts or 
specific constitutional councils. Given that the principle of subsidiarity to a certain extent 
inevitably bears a political weight, the part where the national parliaments are rightfully 
engaged, i.e. in discussing at which level to implement certain policies, is disconnected 
from the more legal and judicial exercise of prioritising how to best implement them.143 
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Therefore, what we are left with is a “subsidiarity stalemate” where neither the judicial 
nor the political avenue is fully appropriate for genuinely ensuring that the EU institutions 
comply with the principle of subsidiarity. For this reason, the “S-word” still remains for 
many mere “gobbledygook” – a fancy yet meaningless, normatively void, term. At this 
point, is there a possible way forward? 
3. CONCLUSIONS 
Throughout this overview of the issues surrounding the interpretation and application of 
the principle of subsidiarity, what has become even more obvious is the fundamental 
tension within the complex nature of the concept itself, and within both institutionalised 
avenues designated in the EU for addressing it efficiently. The vagueness, the interrelation 
with other principles, the broader political significance and the clash between legal and 
political essentials of the principle all burden the substantive perception of subsidiarity 
in the EU political arena. On the one hand, the judicial avenue for safeguarding the 
principle suffers from numerous problems. These include, to name a few: the CJEU’s 
restrictive and undemanding approach in the face of the political sensitivity of the 
principle; all the procedural and substantive limits of the concept of subsidiarity; and the 
judicial inappropriateness and incapacity in terms of expertise, time and resources to 
address the parts of the principle which require complex socio-political and 
economic/technical exercises. On the other hand, the political avenue, envisaged as the 
Member States’ parliaments acting in concert as the guardians of subsidiarity, is stuffed 
with another set of shortcomings. Most importantly, national legislators appear 
inefficiently equipped, engaged and inappropriately coordinated to exercise their 
monitoring responsibilities in the best possible manner. 
However, it is still left to assess from the future case law and parliamentary practice 
whether such a constellation of roles in subsidiarity monitoring will be confirmed. In 
other words, will the Court preserve its self-restrained approach to subsidiarity, or will it 
move from exercising mostly a formal check on the EU’s justification for action to delve 
into the substance of the proposed actions?144 At the same time, will the national 
parliaments learn how to make the best use of the existing procedural mechanism for 
safeguarding subsidiarity? Contemporary EU legal scholarship has paid strong attention 
                                                        
amended later in the procedure. What is evident in the current state of affairs is the extension of regulatory 
tools through either the use of soft-law instruments or the Court of Justice’s pro-EU integrationist 
judgments, at least in the core areas attached to the internal market regulation, which always remain out of 
reach of the national parliaments’ scrutiny. Cf. n. 64 for a remark on the characterisation of the CJEU as “pro-
integrationist”. 
144 Wyatt, op. cit. (n. 17), p. 17. The author puts special emphasis on the Court’s role and sees it as decisive 
for subsidiarity. The CJEU had devised and refined numerous legal principles aimed at attributing authority 
and supremacy to EU institutions, and effectiveness and credibility to EU laws. However, the Court still 
struggles to accept the legitimacy of subsidiarity as a fundamental principle of the EU legal order, 
incorporated in the Union’s “normative constitution” by the Member States, and at the same time rejects 
the principle’s part in the “ideological constitution”, which the Court itself is envisaged to observe as the 
guardian of the Treaties. 
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to analyse subsidiarity extensively, but the practice has demonstrated its low efficiency in 
achieving its envisaged role.145 Initial research has indicated serious shortcomings and 
limitations of both legal and institutional frameworks, with subsidiarity up until now 
being applied rather ineffectively in withholding excessive EU actions and balancing the 
allocation of power between the Union and its Member States. However, the vast majority 
of that scholarship remains descriptive, and subsidiarity has gradually escaped its 
attention – it was as if all the issues had been identified and definitively discussed. 
Academic debate and political reality have reached a dead-end where the status quo is 
assumed to be insurmountable. To maintain this “subsidiarity stalemate” would be 
unsatisfactory when considering the principle’s constitutional importance. Therefore, 
this contribution has aimed to re-introduce discussion on subsidiarity and offer new 
solutions to the “subsidiarity conundrum”. 
The necessity of having and pursuing an effective system of subsidiarity protection in a 
complex political entity such as the EU still holds massive significance.146 New critical 
ideas are worth continuously exploring while searching for novel institutional 
mechanisms to refine the principle’s interpretation and application. To paraphrase the 
CJEU’s current president, EU action must not adversely affect national democracies, and a 
variety of EU institutions and bodies – be it political, judicial or technocratic – ought to 
devise mechanisms to accommodate the decision-making process so as to create “more 
democracy”,147 where the principle of subsidiarity plays a prime role. Along these lines, 
the Commission’s president has recently announced “setting up a Subsidiarity and 
Proportionality Task Force […] to take a very critical look at all policy areas, to make sure 
we are only acting where the EU adds value”.148 
                                                        
145 Constantin, op. cit. (n. 13), p. 177. 
146 Subsidiarity as a concept has, moreover, a wider rationale and logic that is important to observe in an 
increasingly complex, interrelated and interconnected international political and economic environment. 
De Burca, op. cit. (n. 14), explains how it poses not only a dilemma of the EU against national/local action, 
but also a question of concerted international action within a global patchwork of institutions, e.g. in the 
World Health Organisation or the World Trade Organisation (p. 6). Therefore, subsidiarity relates to the 
broader contemporary debate about “fundamental questions of political authority, government and 
governance”, in which it oscillates between the two dynamic poles: the weakening of nation-states and their 
porous borders in face of globalisation trends versus the stronger impetus for regionalisation and 
localisation with reinforced direct democratic participatory mechanisms (pp. 2-3). The author further 
argues that the process of economic globalisation has resulted in an “unprecedented emergence of an 
expanding and strengthened ‘market without state’, with inevitable loopholes for democracy and 
legitimacy” (p. 12). The EU, embedded in the framework of multi-level governance, power-diffusion among 
different actors and its heterogeneous (historically, culturally and ideologically) constituent units, 
nowadays faces the same dilemmas. Therefore, the EU constitutional law remains in constant search of 
“ways of resolving the tensions and balancing the interests of integration and differentiation, of 
harmonisation and diversity, of centralisation and localisation or devolution” (p. 10). Here, subsidiarity as 
a fundamental concept goes to the very heart of the political debate about the existence and purpose of the 
European enterprise itself: is there more of the EU than its strict economic essentials, and how far should 
the internal market logic be expanded? (p. 27). 
147 Lenaerts, K., The Principle of Democracy in the Case Law of the European Court of Justice, International & 
Comparative Law Quarterly, Vol. 62, No. 2, 2013, p. 303. 
148 European Commission, op. cit. (n. 103). 
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Leaving aside a more abstract and theoretical narrative, subsidiarity in some future 
development phases of the EU may catalyse many concrete positive dynamics: from 
mainstreaming EU affairs within national parliaments, to possibly having spill-over 
effects in increased resources being invested in EU affairs at national levels.149 Some 
commentators, however, see the recent developments of including lower levels of 
governance in the EU integration process as a sign of the re-emergence of the importance 
of nation-states in Europe, with parliaments representing the “most tangible embodiment 
of the state”.150 Reconciling a more effective principle of subsidiarity with prospects for 
deeper and faster integration at the EU level, while ensuring that the former does not 
threaten or undermine but rather strengthens the latter, is perhaps the most salient 
challenge faced nowadays by the EU political elites. The basic distinction in character 
between the numerous policy areas, which are precisely on the basis of subsidiarity better 
tackled at either the EU level (external trade, internal market, environmental protection) 
or national or even sub-regional levels (culture, language, primary education) should be 
recalled here. In Hayekian terms, the heterogeneity of preferences within the EU 
presumes decentralised decision-making, while economies of scale and interregional 
externalities push for the centralisation of regulatory powers.151 Until now, however, this 
is not what has happened in the EU.152 In the words of the German Federal Constitutional 
Court in its landmark Lisbon Treaty judgment, the exercise of EU powers should occur 
where there is a “genuine cross-border dimension which necessitates harmonized action, 
and parliaments have a responsibility to remain vigilant and guard against unnecessary 
EU legislation”.153 Hence, harmonised operation and coexistence between subsidiarity 
and the “ever closer Union” remains the Holy Grail of EU law and politics.154 For many 
authors, the operationalisation of the principle of subsidiarity, so far underused 
institutionally, albeit much exploited in political debates,155 is essential for reinventing 
the democratic legitimacy of the EU and ensuring its future existence. The latter has been 
in an unprecedented way threatened by the recent rise of nationalist, populist and illiberal 
political rhetoric in the post-Brexit era. 
Finally, going back to institutional arrangements in search of the optimal mechanism for 
safeguarding subsidiarity, throughout the literature certain scenarios have appeared that 
                                                        
149 Cygan, op. cit. (n. 5), p. 485. 
150 Ibid, p. 481. 
151 Hayek, F. A., The Use of Knowledge in Society, American Economic Review, Vol. 35, 1945. 
152 What we have actually seen is “substantial harmonization and centralization occurring in areas where 
heterogeneity of preferences is predominant (such as social protection or agricultural policy), whereas 
other areas characterized by strong economies of scale (such as defence and environmental protection) 
have remained in the local domain”. See van Zeben, J., Subsidiarity in European Environmental Law: A 
Competence Allocation Approach, Harvard Environmental Law Review, Vol. 38, 2014, fn 19, p. 418.  
153 As cited in Cygan, op. cit. (n. 5), p. 489. 
154 In addition, the reinforced principle of subsidiarity implies taking into account regional and local 
information and knowledge in the quest for increased welfare and a more cohesive and inclusive Europe. 
This signifies more experimentation and more quality inputs, but also greater engagement from the local 
levels in EU affairs, from citizens who appear disenfranchised from domestic political life in general, let 
alone from distant EU politics. In parallel with this goes the potential for the cultivation of political 
awareness and civic participation and activism. See Arribas & Bourdin, op. cit. (n. 27), p. 16. 
155 van Zeben, op. cit. (n. 25), p. 38. 
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are possible, yet distant, future novelties for resolving the “subsidiarity conundrum”. A 
more modest idea would look for an improvement of the present “mixed” system of 
binding judicial ex post and consultative political ex ante scrutiny. It would include the 
reinforced role of the CJEU, engaging with subsidiarity as a procedural norm, and the 
operative coalition of active national parliaments or chambers, supported by a technical 
organ representing their interest in Brussels, and selecting a controversial proposal for 
collective scrutiny under the EWS, in the fashion of an advisory, but not co-legislative, 
informal forum. A more far-reaching idea would see the emergence of a special EU 
subsidiarity tribunal, with an ex post legally binding perspective and capacity to rule on 
the compatibility of EU legislation with the principle of subsidiarity. This would be 
coupled with a second/federalist chamber of the European Parliament, representing the 
Member States like the upper chambers in federal states. As a counterpart to the 
Parliament that represents “Europeans as a single entity”, here we would have an 
institutional representation of the “Europe of different peoples”, a kind of EU Chamber of 
Parliaments. 
Along these lines and inspired by the insights of the research leading to the completion of 
the present article, the following institutional arrangement is proposed, which would 
essentially be a combination of the present procedural mechanisms for safeguarding 
subsidiarity with slight modifications. It stays in line with the fundamental principles of 
EU governance, institutional balance and democratic theory in general, but flexibly 
addresses divergences between the Member States and the complex nature of the 
principle of subsidiarity itself. It entails the creation of a new supranational body – the 
Committee of National Legislators, composed of directly elected national MPs, regional or 
local parliamentarians, or national constitutional or supreme court judges, all with a 
proven record in subsidiarity expertise. The exact qualification of the members (s)elected 
would differ in each Member State, depending on the depth and level of their EU 
integration and awareness, scrutiny propensity, institutional capacities, legal history, and 
political culture. The proposed Committee would convene ad hoc, with the right to be 
consulted on certain legislative proposals. It would respond on a case-by-case basis to 
particular policy issues as they arise, providing ex ante binding opinions,156 and with a 
similar but more prominent role than the Committee of the Regions and the Economic and 
Social Council. 
In addition, this proposal addresses another fundamental concern: the issue of judicial 
activism and the “judicialisation” of policy-making. From the point of view of legal 
philosophy and political theory, it is observed how the courts in general, and in the EU 
context the Court of Justice, too often usurp democratic decision-making when rendering 
complex political decisions, in which they rule on the basis of societal and moral norms, 
natural law, economic assessments, technological expertise, etc.157 This criticism 
                                                        
156 Something of an EU Conseil d’Etat. See Kiiver, op. cit. (n. 8). 
157 See, for illustration, Alter, K. & Kelemen, D., Understanding the European Court’s Political Power; and 
Rabkin, J., A Strange Institution, in: Zimmermann, H. & Dür, D. (Eds.), Key Controversies in European 
Integration, Chapter 5 - Too Much Power for the Judges?, Palgrave MacMillan, 2012; Alter, K., The European 
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questions the appropriateness of the judiciary to engage in such exercises, and proposes 
other categories of professionals to be included in these decision-making processes, e.g. 
philosophers, political scientists, sociologists, economists, etc. The composition of a new 
supranational body proposed here, with quasi-judicial competences and accommodating 
a wide variety of actors, would effectively respond to this principal criticism of 
contemporary judicial politics. In any event, novel institutional arrangements, 
reconceptualising the fundamental constitutional principles of EU law, reflecting the 
dynamic and flexible nature of EU law, and adaptable to the newly emerging challenges 
and designated objectives of European integration, are expected from academia and 
policy-makers alike.  
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NAČELO SUPSIDIJARNOSTI U EUROPSKOJ UNIJI: “KOJEŠTARIJA” 
ZAROBLJENA IZMEĐU PRESUDIVOSTI I POLITIČKOG NADZORA.  
POSTOJI LI RJEŠENJE? 
 
Načelo supsidijarnosti u Europskoj uniji ograničava ovlasti kreiranja politika i prava tijela 
Unije na situacije u kojima postavljeni ciljevi politika ne mogu biti efikasnije ostvareni na 
nižim (tj. nacionalnim, regionalnim ili lokalnim) razinama vlasti. Postoje dva 
institucionalna mehanizma koji nastoje osigurati poštovanje tog načela od strane 
institucija Europske unije. Pored nadležnosti Suda Europske unije u svim pravnim 
pitanjima koja se tiču primjene i tumačenja odredaba Osnivačkih ugovora, drugi je važan 
mehanizam povjeren parlamentima država članica i odnosi se na politički nadzor 
prijedloga zakonodavnih akata Europske unije u pogledu njihove usklađenosti s načelom 
supsidijarnosti. U ovom se radu uspoređuju ta dva institucionalna mehanizma te se 
analizira načelo supsidijarnosti u praksi Suda Europske unije i u proceduri nadzora 
poštovanja supsidijarnosti koju provode državni parlamenti. Cilj je rada ocijeniti 
prikladnost sudske i parlamentarne procedure za osiguravanje poštovanja načela 
supsidijarnosti te raspraviti može li to načelo zbog svoje dvostruke naravi, tj. pravne i 
političke, uopće biti učinkovito primijenjeno na regulatorne aktivnosti Europske unije 
kroz pravosuđenje ili politički proces. Nakon identificiranja glavnih nedostataka 
navedenih dvaju mehanizama argumentirat će se zašto je postojeći sustav pretjerano 
složen i neučinkovit i kao takav neodgovarajući u usporedi s ustavnom važnošću načela 
supsidijarnosti te posebno u razdoblju u kojem Europska unija nastavlja širiti svoje 
regulatorne aktivnosti na osjetljiva socio-politička područja, koja su inače smatrana 
ovlastima država članica. Na kraju, uzimajući u obzir glavne nedostatke i kritiku 
postojećeg sustava, rad predlaže nova institucionalna rješenja, koja kombiniraju elemente 
sudske i parlamentarne procedure nadzora načela supsidijarnosti. 
Ključne riječi: supsidijarnost, Europska unija, presudivost, politički nadzor, Sud Europske 
unije, državni parlamenti 
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